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Abstract
We address the challenge of designing performance-based incentive schemes for schoolteach-
ers. When teachers specialize in different subjects in the presence of social prejudice, perfor-
mance based pay which depends on the average of student performance can cause teachers to
coordinate their effort in high status students and away from low status students. Laboratory
experiments conducted in India with future teachers as subjects show that performance-based
pay causes teachers to decrease effort in low caste Hindu students compared to upper caste
Hindu or Muslim students. We observe greater effort and lower intra-class variation when
teachers are penalized if students receive zero scores.
Keywords: Teacher incentives, Laboratory experiments, Coordination games, Discrimination.
JEL Codes: C92, I22, I28, J15.
∗Corresponding author. Economics and Public Policy Area, Indian School of Business, Gachibowli, Hyderabad
500032 India, email: tarun jain@isb.edu. This research would not have been possible without the hospitality
of Amity Institute of Education during the laboratory experiments. Advice from Jonathan Alevy, Emily Blanchard,
AJ Bostian, Leora Friedberg, Charles Holt, Sanjay Jain, John Pepper and Ashima Sood helped to improve the paper
substantially. We also thank seminar participants at the University of Virginia, Abt Associates and various conferences
for their comments. We are grateful for financial support from the Department of Economics at the University of
Virginia during the pilot stage of this study. All errors are our own.
1 Introduction
Performance-linked salaries for teachers are a key element of many policies proposed to reform
educational systems in both developing and developed countries. By tying pay to performance, as
measured by achievement of students on tests, policy makers hope to align teachers’ self-interest
with socially desired outcomes, motivating teachers to improve attendance, innovate on pedagogy
and spend more time with students. In the United States, No Child Left Behind (NCLB 2001)
mandates that students achieve federal standards in reading and mathematics, failing which schools
incur a range of penalties including loss of funding for teacher salaries. In developing countries
such as India, teachers receive performance linked promotions and salaries in private schools, but
not so in public schools that educate the vast majority of students. A number of field trials confirm
that linking salary to student performance on external tests increases teacher effort in instruction,
leading to improvements in students’ scores. Lavy (2002) evaluates the fiscal efficacy of expendi-
tures on teacher salary incentives compared to additional expenditures on teaching aids. Glewwe,
Ilias, and Kremer (2003) and Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2006) implement randomized field
trials where the teacher’s compensation is a linear function of the mean score of the students in the
class.
Although the link between incentive based pay and improvement in student test scores has been
studied extensively, the literature does not sufficiently address distributional aspects of these in-
centives, in particular the potential for differential teacher effort in students that can cause unequal
outcomes. A notable exception is Neal and Schanzenbach (2008)’s study which reports that the
design of the NCLB provides an incentive for schools to target students near the proficiency level
for extra attention while ignoring students who are either clearly proficient or have little chance of
becoming so. In addition, Neal and Schanzenbach (2008) show that inequality in teacher invest-
ments in students is at least partly conditioned on student identity, with Black and Hispanic boys
recording the lowest improvement in scores. Inequality in achievement on the basis of identity is
economically inefficient if the incentive implies that high ability students do not receive teacher
inputs at the expense of lower ability students, a concern valid in both the United States as well as
developing countries that experience social stratification on the basis of group identity.
In this paper, we develop a theoretical model where the design of a hypothetical incentive pay
program for teachers affects inequality in the classroom. We hypothesize that, in a multi-teacher
environment with imperfect information, a salary that is a linear function of the average score of
students in the class provides an incentive for teachers to coordinate their effort on a few students
to maximize their payoff. Such an incentive can be the result of externalities in teaching two
related subjects. For example, input from a Mathematics teacher can impact students’ Science
achievement, and vice versa. Insofar as teachers require a focal point for coordination, they might
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pick students’ social identity, investing greater effort in teaching students with high social status
and ignoring those with low status, We denote this mechanism “strategic discrimination”. Thus,
even if teachers are not prejudiced, pay based on student performance can cause sorting of student
achievement on the basis of social identity as long as there is an expectation of prejudice by some
teachers.
We test this hypothesis by conducting laboratory experiments in India using future teachers as
participants. The costs of large field trials constrain extensive testing of a variety of incentive de-
signs. Further, an important variable of interest, teachers’ effort devoted to students, is unobserved
in data from surveys or field trials. Hence, the mechanisms that cause poor distributional outcomes
might not be conclusively identified. These limitations can be overcome by conducting labora-
tory experiments with appropriate subject pools. Laboratory methods have the advantage of being
relatively inexpensive and quick to implement compared to large field trials, so multiple designs
can be tested on the same sample of experimental subjects, provided that care is taken to mitigate
sequence effects. Teachers’ investment in students is observable in the laboratory, allowing the
researcher to identify the particular behavior that impacts outcomes.
Field-based laboratory experiments show promise as a tool for shaping educational policy.1
Hoff and Pandey (2006) conduct an experiment in rural India measuring the impact of revealed
social identity on children’s performance in educational games. They report that a history of caste-
based prejudice implies that Scheduled Caste (SC) participants are not confident that they will be
paid by high-caste experimenters, leading to reduced effort. Cadsby and Maynes (1998) and Ball
and Cech (1996) show that the choice of subject pool affects the outcomes of policy-oriented ex-
periments. These results motivate our decision to use participants who are enrolled in Bachelor of
Education (B.Ed.) programs and will be teachers in the future. One potential concern is the degree
to which laboratory experiments are representative of field settings. Bauer, Chytilova´, and Mor-
duch (2008) compare survey data with data from field-based laboratory experiments conducted in
three districts in rural India and report that patience and risk aversion measured by laboratory ex-
periments predict behavior in field settings. In the absence of similar studies with school teachers,
we take a conservative approach while designing experiments.
India is a particularly appropriate setting for these experiments since the country is considering
incentive-based pay for teachers in government-operated schools (Sixth Central Pay Commission
2008). Indian society also experiences widespread prejudice based on caste, religion and gender
(Govt. of India 2006), as well as significant differences in the educational achievements of upper
caste Hindus compared to lower caste Hindus and Muslims (The PROBE Team 1999). Desai and
Kulkarni (2008) find that 62 percent of children from upper caste Hindu and other religious groups
(excluding Muslims) are likely to complete primary school, compared to 44 percent of Muslim
1?) classify these as “artefactual field experiments”.
2
children, 39 percent of Scheduled Caste children and 32 percent of Scheduled Tribe (ST) children.
In addition, Hanna and Linden (2009) report that teachers discriminate on the basis of both caste
and gender while marking exams, although paradoxically they find that SC teachers discriminate
against SC students.
In our experiments, participants are assigned the role of one among five subject teachers and
have to choose which students to invest in under various incentive designs. We first test a fixed
reward structure where the teacher’s salary does not depend on student performance. This struc-
ture reflects the current compensation scheme for government school teachers. We expect that a
payoff maximizing teacher will not invest much effort in her students under this scheme. We then
test a reward structure where a teacher’s salary depends on the mean score of students in her class,
incorporating variations with zero or positive returns to coordination. We expect greater discrim-
ination on the basis of social identity in treatments with positive returns to coordination. Finally,
we test a remedial treatment that help mitigate outcomes for those students who would potentially
not receive any investment from teachers.
The results of our experiments show that teachers pick social identity as a focal point for
coordination to maximize their earnings, disproportionately investing effort in upper caste and
Muslim students at the expense of SC students. We estimate that the strategic discrimination
mechanism imposes a penalty of 5 percent on the educational achievement of SC students. In
addition, strategic discrimination is driven by upper caste teachers from urban backgrounds, with
Scheduled Caste teachers coordinating on SC students. In the remedial treatment designed to
penalize teachers if a student receives no attention, teachers distribute their effort more widely,
suggesting a possible way to escape the coordination trap.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops a theoretical model of teacher
investments in students with various incentive schemes. We describe the laboratory experiments
methodology in Section 3 and analyze this data in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes with
discussion of the results and policy implications.
2 Theory
Our theoretical framework models how the incentive structure faced by teachers impacts inequity
in student achievement. This model makes theoretical predictions that we test using data obtained
from laboratory experiments. We model a multiple-teacher classroom environment with different
teachers specializing in instruction in different subjects such as Science, Mathematics, Literature,
Art etc. We argue that the subject matter may generate spillovers from teacher effort. For example,
if a Mathematics teacher offers assistance during office hours to a student, that investment impacts
not only the student’s understanding of Mathematics, but also his understanding of Science and
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other quantitative subjects.2 As a result, a student’s achievement in a particular subject depends on
the effort of all teachers. Thus, in multiple teacher environments, we argue that students experience
returns to coordination in teacher investments.3
A second element of the theoretical framework is the perception of identity-based prejudice in
society, i.e., there exists a social group such that at least some teachers believe that others will dis-
criminate against the group. Such an assumption is justified in most societies and particularly so in
India because of a history of caste and religion-based discrimination (Deshpande 2006; Newman
and Thorat 2007). At the same time, openly acknowledging such discrimination might carry some
stigma, so individuals might not perfectly know about the prejudices of their colleagues. Social
discrimination is widespread in the education sector in India (Desai and Kulkarni 2008). Sched-
uled Caste and Muslim students experience significantly poorer educational outcomes compared
to upper caste Hindu students (Govt. of India 2006). The PROBE Team (1999) conducted an
extensive independent survey of education in India and attributed a part of these differences to the
behavior of teachers in the classroom. The survey found that teachers ask lower caste students
to run errands during class, neglect to focus on the developmental needs of students from lower
castes, and do not encourage such students to participate in classroom activities. Pandey (2005)
suggested that teachers discriminate against low caste students by granting lower funds from what
is supposed to be a mandated scholarship. Our model therefore focuses on the impact of social
identity in teachers’ decisions to invest in students.
A model of strategic discrimination adapted from Basu (2006) is the cornerstone of the theory.
In a society with pervasive caste-based prejudice, even an unbiased teacher might hypothesize that
at least some of the other teachers are biased in favor of and might invest more in high-caste stu-
dents. Therefore, she will invest disproportionately in high-caste students to maximize her earnings
if the earning increases in the average score of students and there are returns from coordinating with
other teachers. If other teachers also hold the same beliefs, high-caste students will receive greater
investments, leading to better educational results and justifying the initial hypothesis. Thus, incen-
tive design has the potential for sustaining social inequality in a multi-teacher setting even when
not all individuals are necessarily prejudiced. An important feature of the strategic discrimination
mechanism that distinguishes it from previous explanations of discriminatory behavior, such as the
statistical discrimination model of Phelps (1972), is that it does not rely on either the student’s
exogenous ability or endogenous effort as the basis for unequal investments. The student’s social
identity is sufficient to generate discriminatory teacher behavior.
The theoretical model specifies the payoff maximization problem that teachers face, and we
2Without any implications for gender roles, we use female pronouns for teachers and male pronouns for students
throughout this paper.
3?) present a model where teachers learn from each other, which can be an additional source of spillovers.
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solve this problem for optimal investment decisions made by teachers. We show the impact of
these decisions on educational achievement for students, focusing particularly on inequality in
outcomes within the classroom.
2.1 Model setup
In the theoretical model students are indexed by i ∈ {1 : N} and teachers are indexed by j ∈ {1 : J}.
Students are of two observable types, A and B. The two types have the same distribution over
ability, and are otherwise identical except that type B students are subject to prejudice by at least
some segment of society. For simplicity, teacher j’s investment of effort in student i is a binary
choice mi j ∈ {0, 1}. Thus,
∑
j
mi j is the total investment received by student i from all teachers.4
Additionally, a teacher’s total resources are constrained to M j, which is less than N since she is not
able to invest in all students.
We propose a simple education production function where student i’s educational output de-
pends on his observed exogenous ability θi ∈ [0, 1] and the number of teachers who invest in
him
∑
j
mi j. For simplicity, we assume students’ ability is common knowledge and accurately
observed. Hence, we can write the composite educational output yi for student i as
yi = (1 + θi) f
∑
j
mi j, J
 (1)
where f (·) has the following features:
f (0) = 0 (2)
f (m + 1) − f (m) > 0 (3)
f (m + 1) − f (m) is increasing in m. (4)
The first feature implies that students do not learn without teacher input. In other words, there
are no “Einsteins” in our model. The second feature implies that student performance will im-
prove if more teachers invest effort in that student. For instance, investment by two teachers will
improve composite educational outcomes compared to a single teacher. The final feature is the su-
permodularity assumption – the marginal impact of teacher investment is increasing in the amount
of investment. This is a consequence of the returns to coordination by multiple teachers that we
discussed earlier. Hence, the marginal impact of investment by a physics teacher in a student who
4Although we assume that the effect of investment is additive in the special case worked out in this section, the
basic results do not hinge on this assumption.
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has already received training in mathematics and chemistry is greater than the marginal impact of
the same investment in a student who has received training only in chemistry.5
We also assume that a teacher incurs a cost c each time she invests effort in a student. These
costs represent the time and energy that the teacher expends in order to teach a student. For
instance, the teacher’s time spent during office hours can be viewed as an implicit cost incurred by
the teacher. The costs could also represent the effort required to tailor class lectures towards the
needs of a particular set of students. In reality, such costs are not necessarily binary, but assuming
so offers considerable analytical simplicity without sacrificing insight into the problem. Thus, the
total cost incurred by teacher j is
c j = c
∑
i
mi j (5)
Finally, a teacher can draw utility from both her salary and other factors, a distinction that re-
flects that teachers are presumably more other-regarding than other kinds of professionals. Thus, a
teacher’s utility can be written as
u(x, τ) (6)
where
x represents the salary earnings of the teacher, and is henceforth called the “payoff”
τ represents unobserved altruism experienced by the teacher by helping students
along with other unobserved factors that contribute to the teacher’s utility
The salary earnings for teachers and students are determined by the structure of the incentives
offered to them. We vary this structure in order to model various incentive schemes. The following
sections theoretically show the variations and the resulting implications.
2.2 Impact of incentives
This section builds a formal model of teacher maximizing behavior in response to four different
incentive designs. A summary of these designs is presented in Table 1.
A: A fixed salary that is independent of students’ performance, less the cost of investment.
B: A salary that is a linear function of the average student score, less the cost of investment,
with a student’s score increasing exponentially in the number of teachers who invest effort
in the student.
5Arguably, science and mathematics have stronger complementarities than english and mathematics, but we ab-
stract away from this.
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C: A salary that is a linear function of the average student score, less the cost of investment,
with a student’s score increasing linearly in the number of teachers who invest effort in the
student.
D: A salary that is a linear function of the average student score multiplied by the fraction of
students who receive better than zero payoff, less the cost of investment.
In what follows, we use the term “prejudice” to describe teachers’ decisions to favor students
of one type over another when, in the absence of returns to coordination, students of the first type
are of equal or lower ability than the second.
Pr
{
mAi j = 1
}
> Pr
{
mBi j = 1
}
when θA ≤ θB (7)
2.2.1 No incentive (A)
This section examines a teacher compensation scheme where the salary is independent of students’
performance. In this case, the teacher’s problem can be written as
max
m1 j...mN j
p − c
∑
i
mi j such that N > M j ≥
∑
i
mi j (8)
where p is the fixed salary earned by the teacher and the constraint implies that teacher cannot
invest more than the resources available. Calculating the investment decision that yields the maxi-
mum payoff for the teacher is straightforward.
m1 j = ... = mN j = 0 (9)
Thus, a teacher whose salary does not depend on students’ performance but faces a cost every
time she invests in a student ought not to invest in any student. With this result, the students’
outcomes are
yi = (1 + θi) f (0) = 0 for all i (10)
from condition (2). Note that this result holds irrespective of student ability. If we observe any
teacher effort in students, we attribute this to altruism towards students or other unobserved factors
that impact teacher’s utility. However, in the absence of such factors, a fixed salary offers no
additional incentive to invest in students and yields poor outcomes from the perspective of a policy
maker who wishes to improve educational achievement.
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2.2.2 Teacher incentive with returns to coordination (B)
This section considers the impact of a teacher’s salary that is equal to the average score of all
the students in class when there are returns to coordination of teacher investments. As discussed
earlier, we expect that the educational achievement of a student will be increasing in the number
of teachers who invest in him because of spillover benefits from different subjects. So a teacher’s
payoff maximization problem is
max
m1 j...mN j
∑
i
(1 + θi) f (
∑
j
mi j, J)
N
− c
∑
i
mi j such that N > M j ≥
∑
i
mi j (11)
and the supermodularity condition (4) holds. This condition implies that teachers have an incentive
to coordinate their investments and invest in those students who also receive investments from other
teachers. In a school environment, teachers might not have complete information on which students
other teachers plan to invest in. Both student ability (teachers coordinate on high ability students)
and social identity (teachers coordinate on students of a particular social group) are potential focal
points. Since both are observed in this model, we must carefully consider the interaction of identity
and ability to determine which students the teachers invest in. Consider the following cases.
Case 1. θi > θ∗: This case considers investment in students with ability exceeding θ∗, which is
defined such that
(1 + θ∗) f (1) ≡ c (12)
Identity (12) implies that if a student’s ability is very high such that investment by even a single
teacher yields returns greater than cost, then teachers do not face a coordination problem and
would invest in him regardless of the other teachers’ decision. Since the problem is symmetric
for all teachers, students with θi > θ∗ will receive investments from all J teachers and realize high
educational outcomes.
yi = (1 + θi) f (J) (13)
Case 2. θi < θ0: This case considers investment in students with ability less than θ0, which is
defined such that
(1 + θ0)( f (J) − f (J − 1)) ≡ c (14)
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A teacher’s cost of investing in such a student exceeds the marginal return regardless of the invest-
ment decisions of the other teachers. So a teacher would not invest even if all other teachers decide
to invest. Since the problem is the same for all teachers, no teachers will invest in students with
θi < θ
0. As a result, the student’s educational achievement will be 0, from condition (2).
Case 3. θ0 < θi < θ∗: Coordination is salient when a student’s ability is not sufficient to determine
the teacher’s investment decision. Teachers will realize greater payoffs when they select students
who also receive investment from other teachers. This problem is symmetric for all teachers,
so coordination requires a focal point. With imperfect communication between teachers, social
identity offers a potential focal point. When students’ type is observable in an environment with
pervasive prejudice, teachers might hypothesize that other teachers might discriminate against type
B students. Then even an unprejudiced teacher who wishes to maximize her payoff should invest
in type A students.
Pr{mAi j = 1|θ0 < θi < θ∗} > Pr{mBi j = 1|θ0 < θi < θ∗} (15)
Since the problem is symmetric for all teachers, type A students will receive greater total invest-
ment
∑
j
mAi j >
∑
j
mBi j (16)
and realize higher educational achievement compared to type B students.
yAi > y
B
i (17)
Hence, the ex ante assumption that other teachers are biased against type B students will to
hold ex poste. Type B students will receive lower investments because of their social identity, a
result that we term “strategic discrimination”.
2.2.3 Teacher incentive with no returns to coordination (C)
This section models the teacher’s maximization problem with no returns to multi-teacher coor-
dination. The purpose of this exercise is that the strategic discrimination results modeled in the
previous section rely critically on positive returns to coordination. Hence, to empirically identify
the strategic discrimination model, we should examine the difference in teacher behavior when
returns to coordination are positive and when they are zero. The teacher maximizes her payoff as
follows:
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max
m1 j...mN j
∑
i
(1 + θi) f (
∑
j
mi j, J)
N
− c
∑
i
mi j such that M j ≥
∑
i
mi j (18)
Unlike the previous section, the supermodularity condition (4) does not hold. The problem
is identical for all teachers with each teacher’s decision independent of the others. Solving the
maximization problem yields the optimal strategy of investing in the highest ability students. We
can show that there exists a unique θˆ with no returns to coordination in teacher investment such
that
mi j =
 1 for all θi > θˆ0 for all θi < θˆ (19)
where θˆ is such that
∑
i
(1 + θˆ) f (
∑
j
mi j, J) − c = 0 (20)
Hence, for a student with θi < θˆ, the returns from investment are lower than the cost, and vice
versa. Thus, teachers invest only in students above the threshold ability level θˆ. The average score
of all students depends on the distribution of θ. If the number of students with θ > θˆ is less than
M j, the maximum amount of investment available to a teacher, then student achievement will be
yi =
 (1 + θi) f (J) for θi ≥ θˆ0 for θi ≤ θˆ (21)
If the number of students with θ > θˆ is more than M j, then teachers do not invest in some
students with ability above the threshold. In the absence of prejudice, students achievement should
not depend on the type.
Pr
{
mAi j = 1
}
= Pr
{
mBi j = 1
}
when θA = θB (22)
Type B students receive the same investment as type A students. Consequently,
yA = yB (23)
and the educational performance of type B students is the same as type A students. Deviations
from this result are interpreted as prejudice against one type in favor of the other.
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2.2.4 Remedial teacher incentive with returns to coordination (D)
This section examines a remedial incentive design where teacher salary is increasing in the average
score of all students, but decreasing in the number of children who do not receive investments
by any teacher and receive a score of zero.6 In the previous section, we showed that teachers
might strategically discriminate against students on the basis of social identity even if they are not
themselves prejudiced. An incentive scheme that mitigates the effect of such discrimination should
counter the need to coordinate on a specific set of students and distribute teacher effort equitably.
In addition, the remedy must rely on easily and universally observed measures to gain credibility.
We consider a remedial design where teachers are discouraged from completely ignoring a set
of students. The compensation formula thus includes the proportion of students who have invest-
ment from at least one teacher and therefore educational achievement greater than zero. Under this
design, the teacher maximizes her payoff as follows:
max
m1 j...mN j
∑
i
(1 + θi) f (
∑
j
mi j, J)
 [ nN
]
− c
∑
i
mi j such that M j ≥
∑
i
mi j (24)
where n represents the number of students who have received at least one unit of investment and
have positive payoff. When θ0 < θi < θ∗, teachers will realize greater payoffs by coordinating
on a focal point while ensuring that all students get at least one unit of investment. If a non-zero
subset of teachers prefers to invest in type A students over type B students, then investment will be
positive in type A students and zero in type B students.
However, each teacher has some incentive to deviate and invest in the highest ability type B
student. Conversely, if every teacher invests type B students, each has some incentive to deviate
and invest in type A students. This suggests a mixed strategy where teachers invest with positive
probability in both type A and type B students, leading to positive educational achievement by all
students.
3 Laboratory experiments
Empirical evaluation of the model in Section 2 requires a dataset that contains the distribution of
teacher effort invested in students with and without performance-based pay. In addition, the dataset
should measure the returns to coordination from investment by multiple teachers. The data should
allow evaluation of alternative designs that correct for the shortcomings of currently proposed
designs. Finally, the data should contain information on the teacher’s demographic background as
well as professional expectations and preferences on compensation structures.
6See condition (2).
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Such data is difficult to obtain. The precise effort that a teacher invests in a student cannot be
reliably reported, either by an external observer or through self-reporting. The financial and time
costs of a large field trial of incentives for teachers is likely to require researchers to pick a single
design. Finally, survey data does not allow us to experiment with different magnitudes of return to
coordination from investment from multiple teachers.
Laboratory experiments, conducted with an appropriate subject population, can simulate the
essential features of the classroom while evaluating the impact of teacher incentives on classroom
dynamics. Additionally, experiments allow us to model and test a variety of alternative designs.7
To test our model, we conducted a series of experiments in the computer laboratory of Amity
Institute of Education, a post-baccalaureate teacher training institute in New Delhi. Participants
were enrolled in the Institute’s Bachelor of Education (B.Ed.) program that prepares them for
careers as school teachers. Their task was to distribute investments among a list of students (the
“class”) displayed on a computer screen.8 The resulting class performance was calculated and
reported to the participant, along with payoffs resulting from the incentive scheme under consider-
ation. The following sections describe these laboratory experiments in more detail.
3.1 Experimental design
3.1.1 Parametrization of production function
Section 2 introduces an educational production function where f (·) represents the returns from
teacher investment in a student’s academic performance. Theoretically generating the strategic
discrimination result does not require any conditions beyond the basic features of the education
production function f (·) described earlier in conditions (2), (3) and (4). However, calculating
payoffs in the experiments to test these results require parametrization of f (·). For this purpose,
we use a straightforward functional form.
f
∑
j
mi j, J
 =
∑
j
mi j
b

α
J
(25)
α > 1 represents increasing and α = 1 represents constant returns in the number of teachers who
invest in student i. b is a fixed constant that helps to scale the students’ score so that the expected
payoffs are same in all treatments. With this parametric form, b = 0.1911, J = 5 and c = 0.10, we
7One possible criticism of using laboratory methods is that a list of names on a computer screen might not evoke
the same response as a classroom setting. However, the bias in the laboratory would be to lower the magnitude of the
response, so we should expect even stronger results in a field implementation of this study.
8The experiment was programmed and conducted with the experiment software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007)
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calculate the associated parameters for the minimum (θ0) and maximum (θ∗) ability where strategic
discrimination is salient.
θ∗ = 0.684 and θ0 = 0.316
3.1.2 Treatments
Table 1 describes the experimental treatments. With the selected parameters, the expected payoff
in all treatments is the same. Treatment A represents the fixed salary that teachers in government
operated schools in India currently receive. The payoff for the teacher is the fixed salary, set at p =
Rs. 4, less the number of students the teachers decide to invest in multiplied by the per student
cost, c = Rs. 0.10.
In Treatment B, the teacher’s compensation depends on the average performance of all the
students in the class, with student performance benefiting from returns to coordination from teacher
input (α = 1.1), less the number of students the teachers decide to invest in multiplied by the per
student cost, c = Rs. 0.10. In this treatment, teachers can maximize their payoff by coordinating on
the same students. Insofar they use caste and religious identity as a coordination device, we expect
that teachers will invest disproportionately in Upper Caste Hindu students rather than Scheduled
Caste or Muslim students.
The difference in observed total investment between Treatment A and B identifies the impact
of the performance-based incentive program since the only difference between the two is the in-
troduction of performance-linked salaries. Greater overall investment observed in B than in A
indicates that teachers respond to the incentive. However, the difference in investments between
Treatments A and B cannot identify the strategic discrimination model because the control for
Treatment B should incorporate all reasons why teachers might prefer one student compared to an-
other under performance-based incentives except the expectations of the other teachers’ decisions
and the associated returns from coordination.
Treatment C provides this control by modeling exactly the same reward structure as Treatment
B, but removing the returns to coordination from the education production function, i.e., α = 1,
such that teachers have no incentive to coordinate their effort on a few students. Thus, an increase
in concentration of investments in Upper Caste Hindu students and away from SC and Muslim
ones in Treatment B compared to Treatment C identifies the strategic discrimination model.
Treatment D is a possible remedy that mitigates the impact of strategic discrimination. The
incentive structure is the same as Treatment B where the teacher’s pay is increasing in the average
performance of students in the class, except that we reduce the salary by the fraction of students
who receive zero investments. Thus, we expect that teachers will distribute their investment more
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broadly among a greater number of students, which goes further in achieving the aims of the
teacher incentive program.
We conducted the fixed-salary incentive (Treatment A) followed by the variable-salary incen-
tives (Treatments B, C and D), reflecting the direction of the policy change. Thus, sequence effects
are incorporated into the evaluation. With no obvious sequence for Treatments B, C and D, we
conducted each sequence with an equal number of sessions.
3.2 Setup
3.2.1 Names experiment
For student identity in the experiments to matter, the participants must be able to associate names
presented in the student list to a particular caste or religion. Attewell and Thorat (2007) and
Banerjee, Bertrand, Datta, and Mullainathan (2008) show that employers in India are reliably able
to distinguish between applicants from Upper Caste, Muslim and Scheduled Caste categories on
the basis of their name. We restrict the number of names in our experiment to 15, with five in each
category.
To compile a list of names that is widely and accurately identified by caste and religion, we ob-
tained a large list of 800 names from admissions lists posted on the public website of Indraprastha
University.9 These names were classified as “General” (representing Upper Castes) or “Sched-
uled Caste” as required by statutes, and verified by reliable government processes. We stripped
this list of names of the category classification. We presented this list to 10 students from a lo-
cal college and instructed them to indicate which category they believed each name belonged to.
Muslim names were not included in the survey since there is very little uncertainty associated with
them. The final list was composed from 15 names that were 100 percent correctly identified in
each category. The final list is in Table 2.
3.2.2 Subject recruiting
To participate in our experiments, we recruited students enrolled in Bachelors of Education pro-
grams at a private educational institute in New Delhi. To select this site and subject pool, we
wrote to all colleges in Delhi that offered certified B.Ed. programs. After follow-up phone calls,
we selected Amity Institute of Education since classes were in session and participants available
when we aimed to complete the experiments. In addition, the institute offered the use of a com-
puter laboratory where we could conduct the experiments. None of the participants had previously
been a subject in an economics experiment. In all, we recruited 50 participants over two days of
9The list should not be generated by the researchers to prevent bias.
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experiments.
On arrival at the experimental site, participants completed the Informed Consent Agreement
and received a participation fee of Rs. 20 in cash.10 They were then randomly assigned to a
treatment group and led to the computer laboratory. Once the experiments were complete, the
participants completed a post-experiment survey (see Appendix B) and were paid their complete
earnings in cash.
3.2.3 Procedure
The experiment was conducted in five sessions, each lasting approximately two hours. In each
session, ten participants were assigned to one of two independent groups.11 Thus, in a group of
five, every participant was randomly assigned the role of a subject teacher – either Hindi, Science,
Social Science, Mathematics or English. At the beginning of each session, they were seated at a
computer terminal and shown a copy of the game’s instructions (Appendix A). These instructions
were also delivered orally – in English and then repeated in Hindi. Participants who did not know
how to use a computer keyboard or mouse received a private demonstration from the experimenter.
Participants were told there would be multiple rounds. Matchings were fixed to mimic a school
environment where the same teachers repeatedly teach the same students. Figure 2 shows the
information available to each participant before she makes her decision. In each round, participants
were shown a list of 15 students identified by an ID number and name. Next to each student’s
name was a number that represented the student’s intellectual ability. Ability was drawn from a
distribution with mean 0.5 for the entire class, as well as for each sub-group by social identity
(UC, SC and Muslim). Specifically, each sub-group of five names had one student with ability
greater than 0.684 and one with less than 0.316, with three students with ability between 0.316
and 0.684. The mean ability for each sub-group was 0.5 and restricted between 0 and 1 for all the
students in the class. The student’s social identity was not explicitly stated but could be inferred
from the student’s name. Each participant’s task was to choose whether to invest costly effort in
each student, picking at most eight students.
In Section 2.2.2, we predicted that teachers could maximize their pecuniary payoffs by coordi-
nating on a focal point. One possible concern was that participants might pick a focal point based
on the position of the student name on the list. To prevent this, the order of names was randomized,
and participants were informed that the order was unique to them.
Figure 3 shows the information available to each participant after she makes her decision. The
participant sees a “report card” with her investment decision, the performance of all students on
the list and her earnings for the round as feedback for subsequent rounds. Each participant could
10The participation fee is $0.42 based on an exchange rate of Rs. 47.54 per US Dollar on 11/08/2008.
11The computer laboratory had ten seats, which allowed us to accommodate two groups of five in each session.
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see only her own report card and earnings. The investment decisions of the other teachers were
not displayed, but the number of investments in each student could possibly be inferred from
the student’s score. After a practice round, every treatment was repeated for 15 rounds so that
participants would have sufficient time to learn about the nature of the payoff structure, as well as
possibly find a focal point with other participants.
4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we analyze the data generated from the laboratory experiments to evaluate the
impact of a performance-linked teacher salary on classroom outcomes.
4.1 Data
We conducted four treatments, A-D as described above, of 15 rounds each with 10 groups of five
participants each. Hence the dataset contains 3,000 participant-round-treatment observations.
After the experiment, participants completed a demographic survey. Questions were framed to
consider factors that might influence teachers’ decisions to invest in their students, or possible prej-
udice towards social groups. Tables 3 and 4 describe the characteristics of the participants obtained
from this survey. The sample is predominantly female (94 percent), which is not surprising since
teaching is regarded in India as a suitable profession for women. The sample includes a significant
minority of SC participants (32 percent). Other variables attempt to capture the educational back-
ground of the participants, particularly their secondary school experiences, measuring the subjects
they studied, the language of instruction and the type of school they attended. Table 3 suggests that
the majority of participants are from Delhi which conditions both their prejudices as well as their
expectations of other participants’ prejudices, and hence the results should be extended to rural
settings with caution.
The variables in Table 4 report the participants professional plans and preferences. Most partic-
ipants plan careers as secondary school teachers (86 percent) suggesting this is an appropriate pool
to test the multi-subject secondary school environment in our model. Participants’ preferences for
teaching different subjects seem to be evenly distributed between Science, Mathematics, Social
Science and Languages.12 Finally, participants were asked to state their preferences on different
types of salary structures to gauge support for performance-linked incentives. Participants pre-
ferred a fixed salary (36 percent) to a salary that is based only on student achievement (14 percent),
which suggests that implementing the latter might be practically difficult.
12We cannot distinguish between Science and Mathematics since they were combined together in the questionnaire.
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4.2 Results
Figures 4–7 describe teacher investments in students over 15 rounds for each treatment. Table 5
shows the same data in tabular form, along with averages for all rounds and the final five rounds
where the participants are more likely to have discovered the equilibrium. In Treatment A, the
optimal investment in students is zero since teachers receive a fixed salary with costly investment.
Figure 4 shows that participants reduce their effort in students over the course of the session, invest-
ing in 6.64 out of 15 students in the first round, but 5.84 students in the final round.13 Investment
is 6.21 students per teacher averaging over all rounds, although this figure drops to 5.96 students if
only the final five rounds are considered. Since teachers did not reduce their investments to zero to
maximize their financial payoff, we conclude that other, unobserved factors such as altruism have
a large role in teacher investment decisions.
Figures 5 and 6 describe teacher investments by round in Treatments B and C respectively.
There is no clear trend over the rounds in these treatments, from which we infer that participants
do not learn much over the various rounds. The overall level of investment is lower in Treatment
B compared to Treatment A by 0.25, suggesting that performance-linked pay does not achieve it’s
overall goal of increased teacher effort. The difference in investment between treatments is 0.04
when only the final five rounds are considered.
Figure 7 shows the impact of the remedial treatment. Since the remedy encourages greater
investment, the trend is steadily increasing from 6.10 students in the first round, to 6.56 in the last
round, with an average of 6.33 over all rounds and 6.44 over the last five rounds.
The overall results are useful to understand the overal investment in students. However, as
dehscribed in Section XX, teachers engage in strategic discrimination only within the ability range
between 0.317 (θ0) and 0.684 (θ∗). Table 6 reports the fraction of investment in each treatment that
is allocated to students of Upper Caste, Scheduled Caste and Muslim backgrounds with this ability
range. Surprisingly, within this ability range SC students receive the largest fraction of investments
in Treatment A, without any incentive, as well as Treatment C, with incentive pay but no returns
to coordination.
The difference in investments between Treatment B (with returns to coordination) and Treat-
ment C (without returns to coordination) identifies the strategic discrimination effect. As predicted
by equation 15, investments in SC students decline by 1.5 percent when coordination is salient
in Treatment B, a difference that is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Simultaneously,
investments increase by 2.2 percent in Muslim students and decline by 0.6 percent in UC students,
although neither change is statistically significant. Thus, increasing the returns from coordination
lead to teachers decreasing their investments in low status Scheduled Caste students.
13Recall that the maximum allowable investment was 8 students.
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Equation 23 predicts that strategic discrimination as a result of incentive design will increase
the educational achievement of upper caste students compared to lower caste and Muslim students.
Table 10 shows student achievement by treatment and group identity, with a separate column for
achievement observed in the last five rounds of each treatment where convergence to equilibrium
is more likely. These results are correlated with the teacher investment decisions but not a perfect
mirror since heterogeneity in student ability is not considered in analyzing teacher investment.
As before, the difference between Treatment A and B shows the impact of performance-based
pay for teachers, and the difference between Treatment B and C shows the specific impact of
strategic discrimination on student achievement. Table 10 shows that student scores decrease by
0.16 points when the incentive is introduced, although the decrease is smaller (0.02) and statis-
tically insignificant when only the last five rounds are taken into account. Thus, this laboratory
experiment seems to suggest that changing the compensation scheme for teachers does not seem to
have a significant impact on the outcome that policy-makers most care about, i.e., the educational
performance of students.
Conversely, the differences between Treatments B and C are large and statistically significant,
both when considering all rounds, as well as just the final five rounds. Scores for the average
student decline by 0.24 points going from 3.15 in Treatment C (incentive with no returns to coor-
dination) to 2.90 in Treatment B (incentive with returns to coordination). The greatest decline is
among Scheduled Caste students, who lose 0.34 points in educational achievement due to strate-
gic discrimination. In contrast, Muslim and upper caste students lose 0.20 points as a result of
introducing returns to coordination. When only the final five periods are considered, the decline
in Muslim students performance mirrors the decline in Scheduled Caste performance. Thus, the
difference in decline, approximately 0.14 points or 5 percent, is the educational penalty imposed
by the strategic discrimination mechanism.
Tables 7 and 8 examine the behavior of participant sub-groups identified through the post-
experiment survey. As noted in Section 4.1, questions on the post-experiment survey were framed
to classify participants according to such criteria. An obvious category of investigation is the
impact of a teacher’s social identity as either an Upper or Scheduled Caste Hindu.14 Table 7
suggests that strategic discrimination against SC students is driven by Upper Caste teachers. A UC
teacher reduces investments in SC students by 3.4 percent in Treatment B compared to Treatment
C. This result is reversed for SC teachers – an SC teacher increases investment in SC students by
2.3 percent while reducing it in UC students by 5.5 percent. However, since UC teachers form
the majority of the participants in the experiment (68 percent), the average impact is strategic
discrimination against SC students.
We propose three possible explanations for this result. First, SC teachers might have differ-
14None of the participants were Muslim.
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ent expectations on coordination compared to UC teachers. They might be from backgrounds
where the expectation is that other teachers will favor SC students and therefore strategically dis-
criminate against UC students as an earnings maximization strategy. Second, SC teachers might
recognize that the UC majority will strategically discriminate against SC students when coordina-
tion is salient. To decrease the impact of this additional discrimination on students of their own
community, SC teachers increase their investment in SC students. Third, Fehr, Hoff, and Kshetra-
made (2005) argue that spiteful preferences, which they define as the “desire to reduce another’s
material payoff for the mere purpose of increasing one’s relative payoff” are widespread in the
context of the Indian caste system. Thus, SC teachers might invest in SC students to reduce the
earnings of UC teachers, despite receiving lower payoffs themselves, as a way to increase their
relative earnings. In the absence of further treatments, however, it is difficult to determine which
of these explanations accurately describes the results.
Apart from teacher’s identity, we consider the potential for strategic discrimination based on
other criteria that might influence teachers’ decisions to invest in their students or possible prej-
udice towards social groups. Table 8 presents results based on whether the participant’s origin,
expressed by her parents’ current residence, is from Delhi or outside.15 We find that participants
whose parents live in Delhi are likely to discriminate strategically against SC students (-2.4 per-
cent and statistically significant at the 17 percent level) compared to participants whose parents
live outside Delhi who do not (1.5 percent and statistically insignificant). Since these results are
similar to the results in Table 7, we check whether residence in Delhi is correlated with UC status.
The coefficient of correlation between social identity and residence is -0.098, which suggests that
being Upper Caste is not correlated with origin from Delhi. Given this, one explanation for these
results is that students from within Delhi may have more precise information about each others’
prejudices, which allows them to coordinate away from SC students.
An additional variable of interest is the variance of teacher investments across rounds. Table 9
reports the fraction of students in each treatment who do not receive any investment as a measure
of the variance in investment. The fraction of students with no investment and hence variance
in investment increases when incentives are introduced in Treatment B after Treatment A. This
result confirms results from other experiments such as Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2007) who
report that introducing performance based pay for managers who previously received fixed salaries
induces greater variance in employee output. The results in Table 9 suggest that this is motivated
by differential investment in students or employees by teachers or managers respectively. Finally,
we confirm that the lowest variance in investment is observed in Treatment D, where teachers face
a penalty for students who score nothing in educational output.
15In this sample, students whose parents live outside Delhi reported that they live in small towns and villages, not
other metropolitan cities.
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5 Discussion
Financial incentives for teachers to align their effort with the performance of the students they
teach have drawn wide policy attention, particularly in developing countries. This paper examines
the impact of such teacher incentives in an environment of widespread social prejudice. We show
theoretically that in a multiple teacher setting common to secondary schools, an incentive where
the teacher’s salary depends on the average score of students in the classroom can lead to sorting
of students on the basis of social identity. To confirm this theoretical prediction, we conduct labo-
ratory experiments at a teacher training institute in India with future teachers as our subject pool.
The results of our experiments show that even teachers who are not prejudiced might coordinate on
social identity to maximize their earnings, a mechanism we term strategic discrimination. We find
that such strategic discrimination is limited to SC students and does not extend to Muslim students,
and is driven by Upper Caste teachers from Delhi. We conducted a remedial treatment designed
to penalize teachers if a student receives a zero score, and report that overall teacher investments
were more widely distributed as a result.
Our results have implications for policy-makers who are considering teacher incentive pro-
grams. Insofar that sorting on the basis of social identity is driven by incentive design, policy-
makers should rigorously test various designs for possibly pernicious effects. For this purpose,
laboratory experiments using relevant subject pools can play an important role for testing different
designs.
The results should be read with a few caveats. First, coordination between teachers for earnings
maximization is motivated by externalities between different subjects, such as the impact of a
Mathematics teacher’s teaching on achievement in Science. The magnitude of such externalities is
an open empirical question. If the interplay between different subjects is large and significant, then
teacher coordination under incentives gains salience as a major policy concern.
Second, these results are specific to a particular social situation. Prejudice as well as strate-
gic discrimination against Muslims was significant in pilot experiments conducted in the Indian
state of Gujarat, but not so in the main experiments conducted in Delhi. Gujarat was the site of
widespread violence targeting Muslims, which might cause teachers to think that the other teach-
ers are prejudiced against Muslims. However, no corresponding violence occurred in Delhi which
is a large cosmopolitan metropolis where prejudice against Muslims is less salient. This implies
that policy-makers should account for local social conditions while designing teacher incentive
programs.
Finally, due to practical limitations, we could not incorporate two elements of classroom be-
havior that are also important for assessing the impact of teacher incentives. In these experiments,
we assumed that student effort is exogenous in the classroom. Hoff and Pandey (2006) argue
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that students respond endogenously to perceived teacher behavior when social identity is salient.
Hence, an important extension to the current set of treatments would be to allow students to simul-
taneously decide the level of effort that they invest in their studies. Another concern is teachers’
decision to enter the profession might be influenced by incentives. If variable salary incentives are
designed to have the same average payoff as a fixed salary, then higher ability teachers might enter
the profession, and lower ability teachers might not. Insofar that the former have high capacity
to invest in students, implementing teacher incentives can impact student outcomes on that basis.
Evaluating such a scenario would require a two-step model of teacher selection and investment.
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Appendices
A Instructions
A.1 Instructions for Treatment A
Identity:
You have all been assigned roles as classroom teachers, each with different subject to teach. Your role will
remain fixed throughout all rounds of the game.
Students:
You will be shown the list of students in your class with their names. All of you have the same students,
though the order in which they appear on the list is different.
Task:
In this game, each of you will be asked to invest teaching effort among the students in your class. You can
invest in either 8 students, or less than 8 students, but not more than 8 students. Note that this number is less
than the number of students in your class.
Student Ability:
In front of each student there is a number between 0 and 1 that indicates each student’s intellectual ability.
The level of ability is increasing in the numbers, where 0 is the lowest ability and 1 is highest ability.
Investment:
Next to each student’s name, there is a box. If you would like to invest in a student, type “1” in the box;
otherwise type “0”. The number of students you invest in must be less than or equal to the maximum number
written on top. If you want, you can invest in fewer students than the maximum. However, the number of
students you choose must not be more than the number written on the top of the sheet.
Student Performance:
The combination of the student’s ability, whether or not you invest in a student, and whether or not other
teachers invest in the student determines the student’s final marks, based on the following rules:
1. If no teachers invest time in the student, regardless of the student’s ability, the student will get zero
marks.
2. Otherwise, the student’s marks will depend on their ability and the total number of teachers, including
you, who invest teaching effort in the student. If more teachers invest in a student, then that student
receives higher marks.
3. Moreover, the increase in student’s marks is increasing in the number of teachers who decide to invest
in a student. This means that the average marks of all students in the class will increase more if all the
teachers focus their investments in a few students rather than distribute them among many students.
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Rewards:
In each round, you will be paid Rs. 4, minus 10 paisa for each student you invest in. The students’ final
marks will have no impact on your earnings. Your earnings will be paid at the end of the game.
INSTRUCTION REVIEW
Identity:
You are a class teacher.
Task:
You have to invest in your students by typing 1 or 0 in the box next to the student’s name. The maximum
investment is 8. You can put in less effort, but not more, than 8.
Reward:
The combination student effort and the total number of teachers who invest effort in the student will deter-
mine the student’s final marks. You will be paid Rs. 4 less 10 paisa for each student you decide to invest in.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand.
A.2 Instructions for Treatment B
Identity:
You have all been assigned roles as classroom teachers, each with different subject to teach. Your role will
remain fixed throughout all rounds of the game.
Students:
You will be shown the list of students in your class with their names. All of you have the same students,
though the order in which they appear on the list is different.
Task:
In this game, each of you will be asked to invest teaching effort among the students in your class. You can
invest in either 8 students, or less than 8 students, but not more than 8 students. Note that this number is less
than the number of students in your class.
Student Ability:
In front of each student there is a number between 0 and 1 that indicates each student’s intellectual ability.
The level of ability is increasing in the numbers, where 0 is the lowest ability and 1 is highest ability.
Investment:
Next to each student’s name, there is a box. If you would like to invest in a student, type “1” in the box;
otherwise type “0”. The number of students you invest in must be less than or equal to the maximum number
written on top. If you want, you can invest in fewer students than the maximum. However, the number of
students you choose must not be more than the number written on the top of the sheet.
Student Performance:
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The combination of the student’s ability, whether or not you invest in a student, and whether or not other
teachers invest in the student determines the student’s final marks, based on the following rules:
1. If no teachers invest time in the student, regardless of the student’s ability, the student will get zero
marks.
2. Otherwise, the student’s marks will depend on their ability and the total number of teachers, including
you, who invest teaching effort in the student. If more teachers invest in a student, then that student
receives higher marks.
3. Moreover, the increase in student’s marks is increasing in the number of teachers who decide to invest
in a student. This means that the average marks of all students in the class will increase more if all the
teachers focus their investments in a few students rather than distribute them among many students.
Rewards:
In each round, you will be paid an amount equal to the average marks of all students in your class, less 10
paisa for each student you invest in. Your earnings will be paid at the end of the game.
INSTRUCTION REVIEW
Identity:
You are a class teacher.
Task:
You have to invest in your students by typing 1 or 0 in the box next to the student’s name. The maximum
investment is 8. You can put in less effort, but not more, than 8.
Reward:
The combination student ability and the total number of teachers who invest time in the student will deter-
mine the student’s final marks. You will be paid an amount equal to the average marks of all your students,
less 10 paisa for each student you decide to invest in.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand.
A.3 Instructions for Treatment C
Identity:
You have all been assigned roles as classroom teachers, each with different subject to teach. Your role will
remain fixed throughout all rounds of the game.
Students:
You will be shown the list of students in your class with their names. All of you have the same students,
though the order in which they appear on the list is different.
Task:
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In this game, each of you will be asked to invest teaching effort among the students in your class. You can
invest in either 8 students, or less than 8 students, but not more than 8 students. Note that this number is less
than the number of students in your class.
Student Ability:
In front of each student there is a number between 0 and 1 that indicates each student’s intellectual ability.
The level of ability is increasing in the numbers, where 0 is the lowest ability and 1 is highest ability.
Investment:
Next to each student’s name, there is a box. If you would like to invest in a student, type “1” in the box;
otherwise type “0”. The number of students you invest in must be less than or equal to the maximum number
written on top. If you want, you can invest in fewer students than the maximum. However, the number of
students you choose must not be more than the number written on the top of the sheet.
Student Performance:
The combination of the student’s ability, whether or not you invest in a student, and whether or not other
teachers invest in the student determines the student’s final marks, based on the following rules:
1. If no teachers invest time in the student, regardless of the student’s ability, the student will get zero
marks.
2. Otherwise, the student’s marks will depend on their ability and the total number of teachers, including
you, who invest teaching effort in the student. If more teachers invest in a student, then that student
receives higher marks.
3. Moreover, the increase in student’s marks is in the same proportion as the number of teachers who
decide to invest in a student. This means that the average marks of all students in the class will
increase by the same amount if all the teachers focus their investments in a few students rather than
distribute them among many students.
Rewards:
In each round, you will be paid an amount equal to the average marks of all students in your class, less 10
paisa for each student you invest in. Your earnings will be paid at the end of the game.
INSTRUCTION REVIEW
Identity:
You are a class teacher.
Task:
You have to invest in your students by typing 1 or 0 in the box next to the student’s name. The maximum
investment is 8. You can put in less effort, but not more, than 8.
Reward:
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The combination student ability and the total number of teachers who invest time in the student will deter-
mine the student’s final marks. You will be paid an amount equal to the average marks of all your students,
less 10 paisa for each student you decide to invest in.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand.
A.4 Instructions for Treatment D
Identity:
You have all been assigned roles as classroom teachers, each with different subject to teach. Your role will
remain fixed throughout all rounds of the game.
Students:
You will be shown the list of students in your class with their names. All of you have the same students,
though the order in which they appear on the list is different.
Task:
In this game, each of you will be asked to invest teaching effort among the students in your class. You can
invest in either 8 students, or less than 8 students, but not more than 8 students. Note that this number is less
than the number of students in your class.
Student Ability:
In front of each student there is a number between 0 and 1 that indicates each student’s intellectual ability.
The level of ability is increasing in the numbers, where 0 is the lowest ability and 1 is highest ability.
Investment:
Next to each student’s name, there is a box. If you would like to invest in a student, type “1” in the box;
otherwise type “0”. The number of students you invest in must be less than or equal to the maximum number
written on top. If you want, you can invest in fewer students than the maximum. However, the number of
students you choose must not be more than the number written on the top of the sheet.
Student Performance:
The combination of the student’s ability, whether or not you invest in a student, and whether or not other
teachers invest in the student determines the student’s final marks, based on the following rules:
1. If no teachers invest time in the student, regardless of the student’s ability, the student will get zero
marks.
2. Otherwise, the student’s marks will depend on their ability and the total number of teachers, including
you, who invest teaching effort in the student. If more teachers invest in a student, then that student
receives higher marks.
3. Moreover, the increase in student’s marks is increasing in the number of teachers who decide to invest
in a student. This means that the average marks of all students in the class will increase more if all the
teachers focus their investments in a few students rather than distribute them among many students.
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Rewards:
In each round, you will be paid an amount equal to the average marks of all students in your class times the
fraction of students who receive more than zero marks, less 10 paisa for each student you invest in. Your
earnings will be paid at the end of the game.
INSTRUCTION REVIEW
Identity:
You are a class teacher.
Task:
You have to invest in your students by typing 1 or 0 in the box next to the student’s name. The maximum
investment is 8. You can put in less effort, but not more, than 8.
Reward:
The combination student ability and the total number of teachers who invest time in the student will deter-
mine the student’s final marks. You will be paid an amount equal to the average marks of all your students,
less 10 paisa for each student you decide to invest in.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand.
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B Post-experiment survey
 
 
Instructions: 
1. Your responses to this survey are very important to us, so please answer all 
questions to the best of your ability. 
2. All responses will be kept strictly confidential. 
3. Please call the coordinator if you have any questions. 
 
1. Your first name _________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Your last name _________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Gender [Check one] 
? Female 
? Male 
 
4. Caste [Check one] 
? Brahmin 
? Other upper caste 
? Scheduled Caste (SC) 
? Scheduled Tribe (ST) 
? Other Backward Class (OBC) 
? Other (please explain) _________________________________ 
 
5. Religion [Check one] 
? Buddhist  
? Christian 
? Hindu  
? Jain 
? Muslim 
? Parsi 
? Sikh 
? Other (please explain) _________________________________ 
 
Parents’ current residence  
6. State  ___________________________________________ 
7. District  ___________________________________________ 
8. Tehsil ___________________________________________ 
9. City ___________________________________________ 
10. Village ___________________________________________ 
 
11. What is your mother’s highest level of education? [Check one] 
? No schooling 
? Up to primary school (At least 5 years of school) 
? Up to high school (At least 12 years of school) 
? Up to college (At least 15 years of school and college) 
? More than 15 years of school and college 
 
12. Has your mother ever worked outside the house? [Check one] 
? Yes 
? No 
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13. What is your father’s highest level of education? [Check one] 
? No schooling 
? Up to primary school (At least 5 years of school) 
? Up to high school (At least 12 years of school) 
? Up to college (At least 15 years of school and college) 
? More than 15 years of school and college 
 
14. What is your household’s annual income? [Check one] 
? Less than Rs. 1 lakh per year 
? Between Rs. 1 lakh and Rs. 3 lakh per year 
? More than Rs. 3 lakh per year 
 
15. What kind of school did you attend in class 12? [Check one] 
? Government school  
? Public (privately managed) school  
? Convent school 
? Village school 
? Other (please explain) _________________________________ 
 
18. Where was your class 12 school located? [Check one] 
? City  
? Village 
 
19. What subject stream did you take up in high school? [Check one] 
? Science  
? Commerce  
? Humanities  
? Fine Arts  
? Vocational Studies  
? Other (please explain) _________________________________ 
 
20. What was the medium of instruction in your high school? [Check one] 
? Hindi  
? English  
? Local language _______________________________________ 
 
21. Which year of study are you currently in? [Check one] 
? First year of Bachelor’s 
? Second year of Bachelor’s  
? Third year of Bachelor’s 
? Master’s student 
? Other (please explain) _________________________________ 
 
22. Have you ever taught as a teacher (for pay) in a classroom? [Check one] 
? No 
? Yes. Number of months ________________________________ 
 
23. Have you ever had a job (for pay)? [Check one] 
? No 
? Yes. Number of months ________________________________ 
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24. After completing college, what profession would you like to pursue? [Check one] 
? Teach in government school 
? Teach in public (privately managed) school  
? Teach in convent school 
? Teach in village school 
? Work in company 
? Other work (please explain)  ___________________________ 
? Study further (please explain)  ___________________________ 
? Not work outside the house 
? Other activity (please explain) ___________________________  
 
25. Is teaching your first choice profession? [Check one] 
? Yes 
? No 
 
26. If you had a teaching job in a school, which classes would you prefer to teach? 
[Check an option even if you would prefer not to teach in a school] 
? Nursery school 
? Primary school (Classes 1 to 5) 
? Middle school (Classes 6 to 8) 
? High school (Classes 9 to 12) 
? No preference 
 
27. If you had a teaching job in a school, which subjects would you prefer to teach? 
[Check one option even if you would prefer not to teach in a school] 
? Science or Mathematics 
? Language 
? Social studies 
? No preference 
? Other (please explain) _________________________________  
 
28. If you had a teaching job, what compensation structure would you prefer? 
[Check one option even if you would prefer not to teach in a school] 
? Earnings from fixed salary every month 
? Earnings from lower salary plus a bonus based on your student’s  
scores that, on average, pays the same amount as the fixed salary 
? Earnings based completely on your student’s scores that, on 
average, pays the same amount as the fixed salary 
? No preference 
31
Figure 1: Optimal investment with no returns to coordination.
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Table 2: Student names used in experiment
First Name Last Name Category
Surender Bhokal Scheduled Caste
Suraj Kheeva Scheduled Caste
Dharmsingh Bairva Scheduled Caste
Jaiprakash Kirad Scheduled Caste
Sham Lal Nagah Scheduled Caste
Anshuman Shrivastava Upper Caste
Abhijeet Kumar Shukla Upper Caste
Prabhakar Kumar Mishra Upper Caste
Vinayak Dubey Upper Caste
Aashish Kapoor Upper Caste
Mohd Aamir Ansari Muslim
Hidayat Ullah Khan Muslim
Mohd Salman Siddiqi Muslim
Abdul Faisal Muslim
Sadaf Khan Muslim
Notes: Names chosen were identified correctly by all participants in a survey, i.e. 100 percent correctly identified. All
are ordinarily male names. Source: Names survey.
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Table 3: Participant demographic characteristics
Variable Percent or Mean
Number of participants 50
Female 94%
Hindu 100%
Upper Caste 68%
Mother studied up to high school 56%
Mother working outside home 28%
Father schooling up to high school 28%
Parents live in Delhi 80%
Household income
Less than Rs. 1 lakh per year 32%
Between Rs. 1 lakh and Rs. 3 lakh per year 42%
More than Rs. 3 lakh per year 26%
School attended
Government school 56%
Private school 34%
Convent school 8%
Other 2%
School subjects
Science 48%
Humanities 24%
Commerce 16%
Other 12%
Language of instruction
English 66%
Hindi 34%
Notes: Rs. 47.54 = US$1 on 11/08/2008. 1 lakh = 100,000. Government schools are financed and managed by
local government agencies such as the municipal corporation or village council. Private schools are financed and
managed privately. Convent schools are financed privately and affiliated to Christian organizations. School subjects
are specializations selected by students in grades 11 and 12. Source: Post-experiment survey.
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Table 4: Participant characteristics
Variable Value
No. of participants 50
Any teaching experience 22%
Any professional experience 26%
Future professional plans
Teach in convent school 10%
Teach in government school 40%
Teach in private school 36%
Work in company 2%
Other work 2%
Study further 10%
Teaching first choice profession 90%
Grade teaching preference
High school 48%
Middle school 38%
Primary school 8%
Nursery school 2%
No preference 4%
Subject teaching preference
Science or Mathematics 44%
Social studies 22%
Language 26%
Other 4%
No preference 4%
Salary structure preference
Earnings based completely on students’ performance 14%
Earnings from fixed salary every month 36%
Earnings from lower salary plus a bonus 24%
No preference 26%
Notes: Government schools are financed and managed by local government agencies such as the municipal corporation
or village council. Private schools are financed and managed privately. Convent schools are financed privately and
affiliated to Christian organizations. Source: Post-experiment survey.
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Figure 4: Treatment A: Fixed salary
Figure 5: Treatment B: Performance-linked incentive with returns to coordination
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Figure 6: Treatment C: Performance-linked incentive with no returns to coordination
Figure 7: Treatment D: Remedial incentive with returns to coordination
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Table 5: Teacher effort by round
Teacher investment
Treatment
Rounds A B C D
1 6.7 6.2 6.0 6.1
2 6.5 6.0 6.0 6.3
3 6.5 6.1 6.1 6.3
4 6.6 6.0 6.1 6.1
5 6.3 5.8 6.0 6.3
6 6.2 6.0 6.0 6.3
7 6.0 5.7 6.0 6.1
8 6.1 5.8 5.8 6.4
9 6.3 6.0 6.2 6.4
10 6.1 6.2 6.0 6.4
11 6.0 6.0 6.2 6.3
12 6.0 6.1 6.0 6.4
13 6.1 6.0 6.0 6.5
14 5.9 5.7 6.2 6.4
15 5.8 5.8 6.1 6.6
Average (All rounds) 6.21 5.96 6.05 6.33
Average (Final five rounds) 5.96 5.92 6.1 6.44
Source: Experimental data.
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